KRACKing WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

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
Introduction



PhD Defense, July 2016:

"You recommend WPA2 with AES, but are you sure that's secure?"

Seems so! No attacks in 14 years & proven secure.



Introduction

```
/* install the PTK */
if ((*ic->ic_set_key)(ic, ni, k) != 0) {
    reason = IEEE80211_REASON_AUTH_LEAVE;
    goto deauth;
}
ni->ni_flags &= ~IEEE80211_NODE_TXRXPROT;
ni->ni_flags |= IEEE80211_NODE_RXPROT;
```



Key reinstallation when ic_set_key is called again?

Overview

Key reinstalls in 4-way handshake



Practical impact



Misconceptions



Overview

Key reinstalls in 4-way handshake



Practical impact



Misconceptions



The 4-way handshake

Used to connect to any protected Wi-Fi network


- > Provides mutual authentication
- > Negotiates fresh PTK: pairwise transient key


Appeared to be secure:


- > No attacks in over a decade (apart from password guessing)
- > Proven that negotiated key (PTK) is secret¹
- > And encryption protocol proven secure⁷

4-way handshake (simplified)


 \leftarrow - - - - - optional 802.1x authentication - - - - - \rightarrow











4-way handshake (simplified)




















→ Nonce reuse implies keystream reuse (in all WPA2 ciphers)







Reinstallation Attack


































Key Reinstallation Attack

Other Wi-Fi handshakes also vulnerable:

- > Group key handshake
- > FT handshake
- > TDLS PeerKey handshake

For details see our CCS'17 paper¹²:

> "Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2"

Overview

Key reinstalls in 4-way handshake




Practical impact



Misconceptions



General impact



Transmit nonce reset

Decrypt frames sent by victim

Receive replay counter reset

Replay frames towards victim

Cipher suite specific

AES-CCMP: No practical frame forging attacks

WPA-TKIP:

- > Recover Message Integrity Check key from plaintext^{4,5}
- > Forge/inject frames sent by the device under attack


GCMP (WiGig):

- > Recover GHASH authentication key from nonce reuse⁶
- > Forge/inject frames in both directions

Handshake specific

Group key handshake:

> Client is attacked, but only AP sends real broadcast frames



Handshake specific

Group key handshake:


- > Client is attacked, but only AP sends <u>real</u> broadcast frames
- > Can only replay broadcast frames to client

4-way handshake: client is attacked \rightarrow replay/decrypt/forge

- FT handshake (fast roaming = 802.11r):
- > Access Point is attacked \rightarrow replay/decrypt/forge
- > No MitM required, can keep causing nonce resets










AuthReq(SNonce)





































Implementation specific

iOS 10 and Windows: 4-way handshake not affected


- > Cannot decrypt unicast traffic (nor replay/decrypt)
- > But group key handshake is affected (replay broadcast)
- > Note: iOS 11 does have vulnerable 4-way handshake⁸

wpa_supplicant 2.4+

- > Client used on Linux and Android 6.0+
- > On retransmitted msg3 will install all-zero key





 \leftarrow ----- initial stage of 4-way handshake ----- \Rightarrow

























Is your devices affected? github.com/vanhoefm/krackattacks-scripts



- > Tests clients and APs
- > Works on Kali Linux

Remember to:

- > Disable hardware encryption
- > Use a supported Wi-Fi dongle!

Countermeasures

Many clients won't get updates...

- AP can prevent (most) attacks on clients!
- > Don't retransmit message 3/4
- > Don't retransmit group message 1/2

However:

- > Impact on reliability unclear
- > Clients still vulnerable when connected to unmodified APs

Overview

Key reinstalls in 4-way handshake



Practical impact



Misconceptions



Misconceptions I

Updating only the client or AP is sufficient

- > Both <u>vulnerable</u> clients & <u>vulnerable</u> APs must apply patches
- Need to be close to network and victim
- > Can use special antenna from afar



Must be connected to network as attacker (i.e. have password)

> Only need to be nearby victim and network

Misconceptions II

No useful data is transmitted after handshake

> Trigger new handshakes during TCP connection

Obtaining channel-based MitM is hard

> Nope, can use channel switch announcements

Attack complexity is hard

- > Script only needs to be written once ...
- > ... and some are (privately) doing this!

Misconceptions III

Using (AES-)CCMP mitigates the attackStill allows decryption & replay of frames

> Also use 4-way handshake & are affected

It's the end of the world!

> Let's not get carried away ©



Image from "KRACK: Your Wi-Fi is no longer secure" by Kaspersky

Overview

Key reinstalls in 4-way handshake



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Misconceptions



Limitations of formal proofs

- > 4-way handshake proven secure
- > Encryption protocol proven secure





The combination was not proven secure!

Keep protocols simple

The wpa_supplicant 2.6 case:

- > Complex state machine & turned out to still be vulnerable
- > Need formal verification of implementations



"Re-keying introduces **unnecessary complexity (and therefore opportunities for bugs** or other unexpected behavior) without delivering value in return." ⁹ **Disclosure coordination: preparation**

Flawed standard! How to disclose?

Is it truly a widespread issue?



- > Contacted vendors we didn't test ourselves
- > They're vulnerable + feedback on report

Determining who to inform?

- > Notifying more vendors \rightarrow higher chance of leaks
- > We relied on CERT/CC to contact vendors

Disclosure coordination: planning



Duration of embargo:

- > Long: risk of details leaking
- > Short: not enough time to patch
- > Avoid uncertainty: set clear deadline

Open source patches?

- > Developed and tested in private
- > Shared 1 week in advance over private mailing lists

Multi-party vulnerability coordination

For more advice see:

Guidelines and Practices for Multi-Party Vulnerability Coordination (Draft)¹¹

Remember:

- > Goal is to protect users
- > There are various opinions



Conclusion



- > Flaw is in WPA2 standard
- > Proven correct but is insecure!
- > Attack has practical impact
- > Update all clients & check APs

Thank you!

Questions?

krackattacks.com

References

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